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Georgia and Abkhazia Caught 
between Turkey and Russia 
Turkey’s Changing Relations with Russia and the West in 2015–2016 and 
Their Impact on Georgia and Abkhazia 
Andrea Weiss and Yana Zabanova 
Following seven months of severely strained relations, Turkey and Russia began to mend 
ties in late June 2016, when President Erdogan sent a conciliatory letter to his Russian 
counterpart. After the attempted coup d’état in Turkey three weeks later, Russian Presi-
dent Putin called Erdogan to express his support, providing added impetus to the nor-
malisation process. By contrast, delayed and cautious reactions by Western leaders, as 
well as their criticism of the measures taken by the government after the failed coup, 
have caused disappointment in Turkey, where anti-Western sentiment is on the rise. 
While these developments have largely been discussed in terms of their implications 
for the Middle East, they have also affected Turkey and Russia’s shared neighbourhood 
in the South Caucasus, including Georgia and its breakaway region of Abkhazia. The 
Turkish-Russian crisis called into question Abkhazia’s strong ties with the large and 
active Turkish Abkhaz diaspora, an important economic and societal actor in the de-
facto state. In Georgia proper, the impact has been more ambivalent, with potential 
implications for the country’s Euro-Atlantic integration processes. 
 
Relations between Turkey and Russia have 
long influenced their shared neighbour-
hood, the Caucasus. From the 18th century 
up until their demise, the Russian and Otto-
man Empires vied for influence and terri-
torial control in the region. For Georgians 
and Abkhaz, this meant being repeatedly 
tossed between the two rival powers, a 
legacy that has left its imprint on their com-
plex relations with both Russia and Turkey. 
During the Cold War, Turkey’s Western-
oriented foreign policy largely ignored the 
Because Abkhazia enjoys only limited 
recognition by the international com-
munity, the entity, its authorities, offi-
cials and government are all considered 
“de facto”. To avoid redundancy, this 
publication does not use the qualifier 
in all instances, a pragmatic decision 
that should not be interpreted as taking 
a substantive stance on the issue of 
Abkhazia’s independence. 
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Caucasus, then part of the Soviet Union. It 
was only after the collapse of the USSR that 
Turkey sought a more prominent role in the 
region, first in the early 1990s and then from 
2002 onwards, in line with Ahmet Davu-
toglu’s “strategic depth” doctrine, which 
calls for an “an activist engagement with 
all regional systems in Turkey’s neighbour-
hood”. Intent on becoming an energy and 
transport hub, Turkey has prioritised co-
operation with Azerbaijan and Georgia on 
major regional infrastructure projects, such 
as oil and gas pipelines and the Baku-Tbilisi-
Kars rail link (currently under construction). 
Today, Turkey and Georgia describe their 
mutual relationship as a strategic partner-
ship; Turkey’s role in the economic sphere 
is accurately described as that of a “merchant 
hegemon” (a term coined by the Caucasus 
expert Michael Cecire). Ever since Georgia’s 
Rose Revolution in 2003, Turkey has been 
its leading trade partner and a major inves-
tor, playing an important role in softening 
the impact of the 2005 Russian trade em-
bargo. A free trade agreement between 
Georgia and Turkey came into force in 
2008, and visa requirements were bilateral-
ly abolished in 2009. Turkey has consistent-
ly voiced support for Georgia’s territorial 
integrity. From the mid-1990s onwards, it 
has also engaged in military cooperation 
with Georgia, providing military aid and 
troop training and modernising Georgian 
military facilities such as airfields. 
The depth of Turkish-Georgian military 
cooperation has nevertheless largely been 
determined by Turkey’s relations with Rus-
sia and the West. Because of Turkey’s tradi-
tional reluctance to see a NATO or US pres-
ence in the Black Sea, it expressed reserva-
tions about Georgia’s accession plans at the 
2008 Bucharest NATO Summit and invoked 
the Montreux Convention during the 2008 
Russian-Georgian war to limit the passage 
of US naval ships into the Black Sea. 
Despite the thriving intergovernmental 
cooperation (which has largely remained 
unaffected by political changes in Georgia), 
for Georgian society the geopolitical divi-
sions between Turkey and Russia also reflect 
fundamental civilisational rifts. Turkey is 
perceived first and foremost as a Muslim 
and culturally alien country. There are also 
very few civil society contacts between the 
two nations. By contrast, there is still a 
strong sentiment of cultural proximity to 
Russia, although the latter is viewed as a 
hegemonic power and, because of its recog-
nition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and 
its military presence there, as an “occupier.” 
Turkey does not recognize Abkhazia and 
has never lifted its trade and transportation 
embargo, imposed in 1996. However, Tur-
key’s large and well-organized Abkhaz dias-
pora has defied legal restrictions by carry-
ing out trade and investment activities in 
the republic, with Russia’s tacit consent. As 
a result, Turkey accounts for some 18 per-
cent of Abkhazia’s total trade turnover, 
second only to Russia. 
The Turkish-Abkhaz diaspora of around 
500,000 (by its own estimates) dates back to 
the mass exile of ethnic Abkhaz to the Otto-
man Empire in the 1860s and 1870s. It has 
been an active advocate of Abkhaz interests 
in Turkey since the early 1990s, lobbying for 
the restoration of a direct transport link 
with Abkhazia, organising Abkhaz-themed 
events in Turkey, facilitating the visits of 
Turkish businesspeople, MPs, municipal offi-
cials and journalists to Abkhazia, and even 
organising the polling process in Istanbul 
in the 2014 Abkhaz presidential elections. 
The Abkhaz authorities, in turn, view 
the diaspora as an important political ally, 
as well as an economic and demographic 
resource, and have encouraged Turkish 
Abkhaz to resettle in Abkhazia. Today, the 
number of Turkish-Abkhaz “returnees” in 
the republic is estimated at 3,500, with the 
first official census expected to take place 
in 2017. As residence in Abkhazia is not a 
requirement for Abkhaz citizenship (which 
is open to all ethnic Abkhaz worldwide), 
the number of diaspora representatives 
holding Abkhaz passports is much larger 
(probably around 7,500). Many of them do 
business in Abkhazia. It is this special rela-
tionship that the Russian-Turkish crisis in 
2015–2016 put to the test. 
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Abkhaz sanctions as a 
declaration of loyalty to Russia 
Few took notice when, in January 2016, the 
tiny Abkhazia with its estimated popula-
tion of 240,000 announced its decision to 
impose sanctions on Turkey, becoming 
Russia’s only ally to do so. With less than 
50 million EUR worth of imports from 
Turkey in 2014, Abkhazia’s impact on the 
Turkish economy is close to zero. On the 
contrary, it was the Abkhaz economy that 
was more likely to suffer from disrupted 
links with Turkey. It would be easy to jump 
to the conclusion – as some observers did – 
that Abkhazia was forced to sever its ties to 
Turkey under pressure from Russia. Yet the 
way in which the sanctions were designed 
and implemented (or not implemented) 
strongly illustrates the importance of paying 
attention to the existing leeway for balanc-
ing and to local practices, instead of simply 
focusing on grand geopolitical narratives. 
The Abkhaz announcement came two 
weeks after Vladislav Surkov, President 
Putin’s aide in charge of relations with 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, travelled to 
Sukhum(i) in late December 2015. (Since 
Georgia and Abkhazia use different ver-
sions of many place names, e.g. Sukhumi vs 
Sukhum, this publication opts for status-
neutral alternatives.) At a press conference 
with the Abkhaz leader Raul Khajimba, 
Surkov warned that “some circles in Turkey 
view Abkhazia as their zone of interests”, 
signalling that Russia was intent on putt-
ing Abkhazia’s loyalty to the test. Whilst 
acknowledging the diaspora’s special role, 
Surkov stressed the need to ban Turkish 
contractors from participating in infra-
structure projects financed with Russian 
money, and to develop other restrictive 
measures. Locally, the news was met with 
surprise and consternation by those con-
cerned about the sanctions’ potentially 
negative impact on the Abkhaz economy 
and its ties with the diaspora. 
The full list of sanctions was made public 
on 20 January 2016. It includes restrictions 
on the import of Turkish fish, fruits and 
vegetables; on the participation of Turkish 
companies in infrastructure investment 
projects financed by Russia; and on the 
activities of Turkish-registered NGOs (effec-
tive 1 March 2016). In December 2015, the 
authorities had already announced that 
they would ban the lease of Turkish fishing 
vessels, on which Abkhaz fishing companies 
tended to rely. 
To justify the introduction of these 
restrictive measures, the Abkhaz authori-
ties pointed to Article 4 of the Treaty on 
Alliance and Strategic Partnership with 
Russia (2014), which obliges Abkhazia and 
Russia to coordinate their foreign policies. 
Incidentally, the final text of the Treaty 
(originally entitled “On Alliance and Inte-
gration”) was itself the product of compro-
mise after fierce protests in Abkhazia over 
such controversial provisions as opening 
Abkhaz citizenship to Russians and merging 
the Russian and Abkhaz armed forces. 
Implications for Abkhaz-Turkish 
economic ties 
A closer look at the design of the sanctions 
and their subsequent implementation 
reveals the Abkhaz authorities’ desire to 
minimise negative outcomes for the econo-
my. The sanctions did not target such major 
import categories from Turkey as construc-
tion materials, fuel or textiles. Food im-
ports from Turkey, although important, 
had already suffered the previous year as a 
result of the strong US dollar and weaken-
ing Russian rouble, the currency used in 
Abkhazia. With the price of Turkish food 
imports nearly doubling, many Abkhaz 
entrepreneurs had decided to switch to 
Russian products. The restrictions on Turk-
ish NGOs were moot as well: virtually none 
are present and active in Abkhazia. The 
truly important partners for the Abkhaz 
authorities – the Abkhaz diaspora organi-
sations – do not have official branches in 
Abkhazia and mainly organise their events 
in Turkey, inviting Abkhaz participants. 
The ban on leasing Turkish fishing ves-
sels, however, was potentially far more 
problematic. Hamsa, or European anchovy, 
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is the main commercial fish species in Ab-
khazia, and fish products are among the 
top export categories to Turkey. As Abkha-
zia does not have its own ships, it has been 
a common practice to lease them from 
Turkey (with a much smaller share coming 
from Crimea in recent years). The ban was 
announced abruptly at the beginning of the 
hamsa fishing season, which usually lasts 
from December until March, leaving busi-
nesses no time to adjust. The original plan 
to use Russian ships as substitutes failed 
because the latter lacked the capacity to fill 
the catch quotas. In the end, the ban was 
quietly ignored. 
In addition, references to “Turkish com-
panies” or “Turkish citizens” in the text of 
the sanctions are legally ambiguous. The 
diaspora Abkhaz, who conduct most Turk-
ish trade and investment activities in 
Abkhazia, hold Abkhaz passports and are 
viewed exclusively as Abkhaz citizens under 
Abkhaz laws, which makes them exempt 
from the restrictive measures. Moreover, 
companies with Turkish capital are usually 
registered as Abkhaz companies rather 
than joint ventures, which means that the 
sanctions do not apply to them either. 
Apart from the Abkhaz sanctions per se, 
Russia’s reintroduction of the visa require-
ment for Turkish citizens from 1 January 
2016 has created an obstacle to diaspora 
contacts with the homeland. To travel to 
Abkhazia, Turkish Abkhaz use Sochi Air-
port in Russia, located some 10 km from 
the border crossing at the River Psou. In-
stead of the usually uncomplicated pro-
cedure, diaspora visitors now have to apply 
for a double or multiple-entry Russian visa 
in advance. At the peak of the crisis, some 
were subjected to lengthy interrogations 
upon arrival in Sochi or at the Psou border 
crossing. 
In principle, it is possible to circumvent 
the need for a Russian visa by entering Ab-
khazia from the south via Georgia proper, 
for which Turkish citizens do not require a 
visa. This option is not used by the diaspora 
Abkhaz, however, and many are not aware 
of it at all, having relied on the uncompli-
cated border formalities at Psou until late 
2015. Travelling through Georgia also 
entails a risk. According to its Law on Occu-
pied Territories (2008), it is a crime to con-
duct economic activities in Abkhazia with-
out the Georgian government’s permission. 
So is merely entering Abkhazia from Russia 
(which many diaspora representatives have 
done). Both are punishable by very steep 
fines. In addition, the southern crossing 
over Inguri bridge is located far from major 
airports and is poorly equipped. 
However, diaspora Abkhaz from Turkey 
who have obtained Abkhaz passports have 
not been affected by the changes in the visa 
regime. They can exit Turkey with their 
Turkish passports and enter Russia with the 
Abkhaz ones, since Russia recognizes Abkha-
zia and has a visa-free regime with it. This 
fact may increase the demand for Abkhaz 
passports among the diaspora representa-
tives with regular contacts with Abkhazia. 
The resilience of societal and economic 
ties between Turkey and Abkhazia and their 
potential to adapt do not mean that the im-
pact of the Russian-Turkish crisis has been 
negligible. The tensions, uncertainty and 
political risks resulting from the crisis 
lowered incentives for potential investors 
from Turkey to enter Abkhazia’s closed mar-
ket. Russian visa requirements for Turkish 
citizens continue to be an obstacle to busi-
ness and social exchange. Although the 
Abkhaz sanctions were either not imple-
mented or had a limited effect, they did 
raise transaction costs. As one Turkish-
Abkhaz businessman complained in an 
interview with the authors, the most direct 
result for him was the higher costs of pro-
cessing cargo at Turkish customs. Many of 
these obstacles persist despite the ongoing 
normalisation in Russian-Turkish relations. 
The diaspora’s balancing strategy 
The Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey reacted 
with great concern to the Russian-Turkish 
crisis. The Federation of Abkhaz Associa-
tions (Abhaz Dernekleri Federasyonu, or Abhaz-
fed), which is the leading diaspora organi-
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sation, established in 2010, has been known 
for its generally pro-Russian stance. In the 
wake of the rift between Russia and Turkey, 
Abhazfed publicly stated its loyalty to the 
Turkish government, yet refrained from 
criticising Russia directly. Shortly after Tur-
key’s downing of a Russian military jet on 
the Syrian border, Abhazfed representatives 
visited the Russian Ambassador in Ankara 
to discuss future relations and promote 
dialogue. In April 2016, diaspora activists 
and Turkish think-tank analysts took part 
in a round table in Sukhum(i) with the 
participation of Abkhaz officials, as well 
as Russian MPs, businesspeople, and pro-
government experts, to discuss options for 
improving Russian-Turkish relations. It is 
likely that the Abkhaz diaspora’s concilia-
tory stance towards Russia protected it 
from harsher repercussions. 
As for the domestic situation in Turkey 
after the attempted coup, including the 
crackdown on the Gülen network, its im-
pact on Abkhazia has been limited. The 
Gülen movement does not have a strong 
presence in Abkhazia; the only Gülen 
boarding school that ever existed in the 
republic (Basharan Lyceum) was closed in 
2010. Although several members of the 
Abkhaz political elite, including the For-
eign Ministry’s representative in Turkey, 
Inar Gitsba, are Basharan graduates, they 
do not maintain strong ties with the move-
ment and have not been affected. Diaspora 
organisations in Turkey have largely con-
tinued business as usual as well. If anything, 
Turkey’s post-coup intensification of co-
operation with Russia has been welcomed 
in Abkhazia and among the diaspora. 
Between trade and Turkophobia: 
Georgia’s geopolitical and economic 
orientations 
For Georgia, unlike Abkhazia, the crisis in 
Turkish-Russian relations was of less imme-
diate importance. With few exceptions, the 
Georgian media, political establishment 
and civil society abstained from specifically 
discussing the implications of the crisis for 
Georgia. A programme aired by the private 
Georgian TV channel Maestro on 26 Novem-
ber 2015 is illustrative of a debate that by 
and large did not take place in the open. 
The broadcast discussed the question of 
whom Georgia should side with in the con-
flict, rather than inquiring into the impli-
cations of the crisis. 
Lasha Bugadze, a writer and the main 
guest in the programme, challenged the 
formulation of the question. He argued that 
the TV programme makers deliberately 
drew on popular perceptions of Russia and 
Turkey as civilisational fault lines, and thus 
tacitly embraced the propagandist logic 
of the Kremlin. Further, such a question a 
priori precludes an alignment with Euro-
pean values, which should be seen as sepa-
rate from the EU and its exclusive claim to 
represent them, similarly to Orthodoxy 
from Russia. 
The TV programme and its framing clearly 
showed how narratives grounded in geo-
political interpretations prevail in Georgian 
public discourse. According to these narra-
tives, the small country of Georgia has been 
torn between two powers in a centuries-
long struggle. While Russia is represented 
as the aggressive Goliath, Turkey plays the 
Muslim menace that may no longer con-
quer territories, but exercises power through 
cultural and economic means instead. 
The Georgian framing of relations with 
Russia and Turkey in terms of civilisational 
alignments exposes a number of fault lines, 
one of them between a large majority of the 
population and a liberally-minded minority 
constituted by parts of the political elite. 
The former harbours anti-Muslim and anti-
Turkish sentiments in line with narratives 
prevalent in national historiography and 
with dominant currents in the Georgian 
Orthodox Church. By contrast, out of libe-
ral convictions and above all pragmatic 
considerations, the minority tends to wel-
come and encourage close (and ever closer) 
economic, political and military ties with 
Turkey. Yet another fault line runs between 
business preferences and perceived cultural 
proximity. According to a 2015 Caucasus 
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Barometer survey, 61 percent of Georgians 
approved of doing business with Turks, 
while a mere 27 percent approved of Geor-
gian women marrying Turks. 
The existence of anti-Muslim and anti-
Turkish stereotypes and prejudices consti-
tutes a tool box for political mobilisation, 
as could be seen, for instance, in the 2012 
parliamentary election campaign in the 
Autonomous Republic of Adjara. Situated 
on the Black Sea coast at the border with 
Turkey, Adjara boasts a significant Muslim 
population as a result of centuries-long 
Ottoman rule, along with a significant 
presence of Turkish companies of all sizes, 
a lively entertainment industry (including 
casinos, which are banned in Turkey), and 
a sizeable Turkish expatriate community. 
In the campaign for the October 2016 par-
liamentary elections, these issues once 
again resurfaced on a national scale. David 
Tarkhan-Mouravi, the leader of the Alliance 
for Patriots, a right-wing oriented party 
bloc, claimed in an election debate that 
Turkey was an enemy not only to Georgia, 
but to the whole civilised world. He com-
pared the roughly 20 percent of Georgia’s 
territory that Russia has occupied to the 33 
percent of Georgian territory that Turkey 
“occupies”, referring to areas with Georgian 
populations in Eastern Turkey, including 
the historical Georgian province of Tao-
Klarjeti. The implication was that Turkey 
was gradually annexing Adjara. 
Turkey as a less predictable Euro-
Atlantic partner for Georgia 
Apart from valuing Turkey as a leading 
trade and investment partner, both the 
Georgian Dream and the United National 
Movement governments have seen Turkey 
as a vehicle and vector of Georgia’s Euro-
Atlantic integration. After the crisis with 
Russia broke out in November 2015, Turkey 
became a vocal supporter of Georgia’s 
NATO membership. In April 2016, depart-
ing from Turkey’s usual stance, President 
Erdogan called for NATO forces in the Black 
Sea (where none are currently deployed). As 
Erdogan told NATO Secretary General 
Stoltenberg, Russia’s massive military build-
up following the 2014 annexation of Crimea 
was turning the Black Sea into a “Russian 
lake”. 
At the Warsaw Summit in July 2016, 
NATO decided to explore options for ex-
panding its presence in the Black Sea. Al-
though many predicted that Turkey would 
withdraw support after its reconciliation 
with Russia, at the October 2016 meeting of 
NATO defence ministers in Brussels, Turkey 
was one of the six NATO members to express 
a willingness to contribute to strengthen-
ing NATO’s presence in the Black Sea “on 
land, at sea and in the air”. A more detailed 
discussion is expected to take place in 
January 2017. 
The announcement was duly welcomed 
in Georgia, but the actual shape of the pro-
posed force remains to be seen. Turkey’s 
relations with NATO remain ambivalent 
(there are both pro-NATO and pro-Eurasian-
ist factions within the Turkish military and 
political elites), and President Erdogan has 
hinted at applying for full Turkish member-
ship in the Russian- and Chinese-led Shang-
hai Cooperation Organisation. 
The failed coup d’état in Turkey has had 
a more immediate impact on Georgia than 
the Russian-Turkish crisis. Georgia’s Prime 
Minister Giorgi Kvirikashvili incidentally 
became the first foreign head of govern-
ment to visit Turkey after the July 15 events. 
Although his visit had been scheduled in 
advance, he used the occasion to strongly 
condemn the attempted coup and voice 
support for the Turkish government. 
Since the failed coup, Ankara has called 
on a number of countries in the Balkans, 
Central Asia and the Caucasus – including 
Georgia – to close down schools affiliated 
with the Gülen movement. There are seven 
such schools in Georgia, all of them oper-
ated by the Çağlar Eğitim Kurumları Asso-
ciation (three are located in Tbilisi, and one 
each in Kutasi, Batumi, Rustavi and Mar-
neuli). Yasin Temizkan, the Turkish consul 
in Adjara’s capital Batumi, blamed the 
Refaiddin Shahin College in Batumi for 
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“breeding” terrorists. However, the schools 
have gone through lengthy accreditation 
procedures with the Georgian Ministry of 
Education and enjoy an excellent reputa-
tion among the Georgian middle class. So 
far, Georgia (unlike Azerbaijan) has largely 
resisted these calls. Although one school in 
Tbilisi was closed, pupils were merely trans-
ferred to the two remaining schools. 
While the post-coup developments in 
Turkey have undermined its role as Geor-
gia’s Euro-Atlantic integration partner, the 
October 2016 Georgian parliamentary elec-
tions have sidelined the most vocal domes-
tic advocates of Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic 
path. The Republican Party and the Free 
Democrats headed by former minister of 
defence Irakli Alasania, which had left the 
Georgian Dream coalition in 2016 and 2014 
respectively, failed to pass the five-per-cent 
threshold. The Alliance for Patriots, which 
toyed with anti-Turkish stereotypes and to 
which some analysts ascribe a pro-Russian 
leaning, was able to enter parliament, but 
scored only the required five per cent. 
The Centrist party, which had openly cam-
paigned for Russian passports and pensions 
to be distributed to all Georgian citizens, 
was banned from running in the elections 
by a court order. The race was dominated 
by the contest between the United National 
Movement and Georgian Dream, which 
won the majority of votes. 
The new Georgian Dream government 
is likely to maintain current relations with 
Turkey in the economic and security spheres, 
continue attempts at a balanced relation-
ship with Russia, and largely stick to the 
Euro-Atlantic direction. However, it is not 
likely to push as hard for Euro-Atlantic 
integration as in the past, nor is Turkey 
going to play a significant role as a vector 
in this regard. 
All in all, developments in Turkish-Rus-
sian relations will keep affecting Georgia 
and its neighbourhood relations. Georgia’s 
scope for action, meanwhile, is limited. 
Conclusions 
The Russian-Turkish crisis and its after-
math, as well as domestic developments 
in Turkey following the failed coup of July 
2016, have affected Georgia and Abkhazia 
in different ways. Their reactions to these 
events illustrate both the pervasiveness of 
geopolitical narratives in the Caucasus and 
the importance of local practices and bal-
ancing. 
While Abkhazia and Georgia have vastly 
different relations with Russia, Turkey 
plays a special role for both of them. Given 
Abkhazia’s security and economic depend-
ence on Russia (which provides 70 percent 
of its state budget) and its close links to the 
diaspora in Turkey, Abkhazia clearly has 
much to lose from a Turkish-Russian con-
frontation, which explains why the author-
ities and local actors took some pains to 
contain the damage from the crisis. While 
the Turkish-Russian rapprochement has 
largely allayed Abkhaz fears of having to 
sever ties with the diaspora, some effects of 
the crisis persist, such as the sluggish roll-
back of Russian sanctions, the visa require-
ments for Turkish citizens, and, finally, the 
concern that the situation might repeat 
itself in the future. After all, there are still 
many significant disagreements between 
Turkey and Russia, the level of trust be-
tween the two nations is low, and Turkey 
feels threatened by Russia’s growing mili-
tary presence in the Black Sea. 
Although Georgia is in a different posi-
tion, the benefits it might derive from 
prolonged Turkish-Russian tensions are 
limited, while the costs – such as instability 
in the larger neighbourhood or the poten-
tial for retaliation from Russia – could be 
high. Hence Georgia by and large welcomed 
the normalisation of Russian-Turkish rela-
tions. Turkey will continue to be important 
to Georgia in many respects, above all eco-
nomically. Yet Turkey’s growing ambiva-
lence about the West, as well as its crack-
down on democratic institutions, makes it 
a less predictable and committed partner 
for Georgia in its European and Euro-Atlan-
tic aspirations. There is also some concern 
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among Georgia’s pro-Western elites that 
with Turkey stepping up its cooperation 
with Russia and with Russia actively devel-
oping a trilateral cooperation format with 
Iran and Azerbaijan, new regional constel-
lations might emerge which could poten-
tially sideline Georgia, especially if the EU 
and US downscale their engagement in the 
region. 
Recommendations 
This analysis points to several lessons to 
be learned. EU and German policy-makers 
would be well-advised to be more sceptical 
towards purely geopolitical interpretations 
of developments in the region. Instead, they 
should approach Georgia’s (and Abkhazia’s) 
geopolitical framing and narratives as de-
liberate attempts at “truth”-making. In 
terms of regional analysis, as the case of the 
Abkhaz sanctions demonstrates, it is abso-
lutely essential to focus on local practices 
(including at the micro level) and to take 
into account local knowledge and adapt-
ability. 
As the EU’s leverage over Georgia is far 
greater than its very limited influence in 
Abkhazia, it should continue to engage 
with Georgia in a variety of spheres and 
formats, rather than limit its involvement 
to issues of stability which are so promi-
nent in the revised European Neighbour-
hood Strategy. It should also pay attention 
to religious minority rights in Georgia, 
encouraging the authorities to react to 
incidents of hate speech, harassment 
and attacks. It should closely monitor 
the changing regional environment in 
the Caucasus, including the emergence 
of new actor constellations. 
The EU might also recommend that 
Georgia review some of the provisions of 
its Law on Occupied Territories. As the 
example of the Turkish-Abkhaz diaspora 
shows, the law disincentivises potential 
intermediaries with a prior history of en-
gagement in Abkhazia from seeking co-
operation with the Georgian authorities 
and local stakeholders because it criminal-
ises nearly all unauthorised activities in 
Abkhazia. Instead of reinforcing narratives 
of geopolitical incompatibility within Geor-
gian and Abkhaz society, EU policies should 
aim at strengthening economic and inter-
societal ties between and across local actors. 
In the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian 
war in 2008, the European Union adopted a 
policy of “engagement without recognition” 
towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 
policy is premised on the understanding 
that isolation only pushes the breakaway 
entities closer to Russia and solidifies their 
negative attitudes towards Georgia and the 
West (which is in line with the findings of 
Not Frozen!, a 2016 SWP Research Paper on 
unresolved conflicts in the post-Soviet space). 
Given Turkey’s links to both Georgia and 
Abkhazia, it makes sense to include a Turk-
ish component in the policy, something 
that has not been done so far. 
While the EU’s influence on the Turkish 
government is very limited, it may still co-
operate with Turkish civil society (includ-
ing, but not limited to, the Turkish-Abkhaz 
diaspora) on issues related to Georgia 
and Abkhazia. One way of reinvigorating 
engagement without recognition could 
be to facilitate Georgian-Turkish-Abkhazian 
societal dialogue (with a special but not 
exclusive focus on young people) which 
remains much less developed than their 
economic ties. Some topical issues for dis-
cussion could include migration and re-
fugees, interfaith relations, or cross-border 
environmental issues. While these meas-
ures will not resolve the conflict, they may 
be useful in providing a fresh format for 
cross-border people-to-people contacts. 
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